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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether Judge Jones correctly deemed Progressive's Statement of

Undisputed Material Facts admitted where Randall failed to comply with Rule
7(c)(3)(B). In cases where the non-moving party failed to controvert the moving
party's statement of facts, the trial court must deem the facts admitted as an
operation of law.

Therefore, the appellate court reviews that decision for

correctness. USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2010 UT 31, fl30,235 P.3d 749 (Utah
2010).
2.

Whether Judge Jones

abused his discretion in considering

circumstantial evidence of the contents of the UIM rejection form that Randall signed
where the original was lost or destroyed. The trial court has broad discretion to
admit or exclude evidence and the appellate courts will only disturb its ruling for
abuse of discretion. Ferguson v. Williams & Hunt, Inc., 2009 UT 49, fl43, 221 P.3d
205 (Utah 2009).
3.

Whether Judge Jones correctly decided that Progressive was entitled

to summary judgment on Randall's declaratory judgment claim. "A trial court's
decision to grant or deny a motion for summary judgment is a legal one and will be
reviewed for correctness." Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, fl13,
70 P.3d 35 (Utah 2003).

100.243
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STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-305.3 states in relevant part:
(2)(g) (i) A named insured may reject underinsured motorist coverage
by an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage
under Subsection 31 A-22-302(1)(a).
(ii) A written rejection under this Subsection (2)(g) shall be on a form
provided by the insurer that includes a reasonable explanation of the
purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and when it would be
applicable.
(iii) A written rejection under this Subsection (2)(g) continues for that
issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in writing requests
underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer.

Utah Rule of Evidence 1004 states in relevant part:
The original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of a
writing, recording, or photograph is admissible if:
(1) Originals lost or destroyed. All originals are lost or have been
destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad
faith.. .
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(B) states:
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall contain
a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts
in dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the
opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any
dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits
or discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing
memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or
discovery materials.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In June of 2005, Schroader-Blackley Insurance Agency ("Schroader-Blackely")
assisted Rex Randall and his wife, Jackie, in applying for an insurance contract with
Progressive. As part of that application process, Randall was presented with a form
provided by Progressive that he signed rejecting underinsured motorist ("UIM")
coverage. Randall's application for insurance was uploaded electronically, and the
signed documents were retained in the office of Schroader-Blackley. SchroaderBlackley retained the documents for four years, exceeding the state-mandated
retention period by one year, but discarded the documents prior to the time Randall
desired to make a claim for UIM benefits.
Randall was involved in an automobile accident on May 18, 2006. In 2010,
he settled with the driver of the other vehicle and made a claim to obtain additional
money for his injuries from Progressive. Progressive denied Randall's claim
because he had rejected UIM coverage and had not paid a premium for UIM
coverage. Randall demanded to see the UIM rejection form, but it was not available
due to the fact that Schroader-Blackley had disposed of it one year prior to Randall's
claim.
Randall has erroneously urged the Court to allow him to avoid the
consequences of his decision to reject UIM coverage by reforming his insurance
contract simply because Progressive is unable to physically produce the UIM
rejection form he signed. Randall has alleged he did not sign a UIM rejection form,
but he has failed to support that allegation with any competent evidence.

100.243
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Progressive, on the other hand, has presented competent evidence that
Randall signed a UIM rejection form that complied with Utah law. Despite the fact
that the original document has been lost, the evidence demonstrates that Randall
rejected underinsured motorist coverage that Progressive presented him with a UIM
rejection form to sign.
Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, Judge Jones granted summary
judgment for Progressive and denied Randall's motion for summary judgment. This
Court should affirm that decision because the undisputed material facts show that
Progressive is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
On June 3, 2005, Plaintiff Rex Randall worked through a local insurance
brokerage, Schroader-Blackley Insurance, to contract with Progressive for the
purchase of automobile insurance on his 1989 Ford Escort. (R. 0145-46, 0149-50,
0160.) On May 18, 2006, Randall was involved in a motor vehicle accident in the
1989 Ford Escort and has since made a claim against Progressive for underinsured
motorist ("UIM") coverage. (R. 0178-79.)
Maria Warby was the agent from Schroader-Blackley that worked with Randall
to apply for the insurance contract. (R. 0167-70, 0149, 0153.) Warby obtained
information from Randall and then entered the information into an electronic
application that was uploaded to Progressive with the Randalls' selections on
coverage. Id. Warby printed insurance policy forms generated by Progressive and
had the Randalls sign the forms. The owner of Blackley-Schroader Insurance
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Agency, testified that "[a]ccording to which policy you're issuing, which coverages
you are selecting, the insurance company . . . software will print out the forms that
need to be signed and then we review that with the customer, obtain the signatures,
obtain the down payment and issue the policy." (R. 0153.)

Randall recalled

providing several signatures on a multiple page automobile insurance application
form, but could not recall what the form contained or how many signatures it
required. (R. 0174-75.)
After reviewing the insurance policy forms with the Randalls and their
selections, the Randalls signed the insurance application in several places. (R.
0167-70).

The form Randall signed provided an explanation of Underinsured

Motorist Coverage, as well as the different premiums for different UIM coverages
selected. (R. 0187-88, 0190.) The form stated:
I have been offered and I waive the option to purchase Underinsured Motorist
Bodily Injury Coverage in an amount equal to the limits of my bodily injury
liability coverage. Instead, as shown below, I either: 1) elect lower limits of
Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage; or 2) reject the option to
purchase any Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage.
I understand that Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage protects me,
my resident relatives, and occupants of a covered vehicle if any of us sustains
bodily injury, including any resulting death, in an accident in which the owner
or operator of a motor vehicle who is legally liable does not have enough
insurance (an underinsured motorist).
I understand and agree that the election or rejection below shall be binding on
all persons insured under the policy, and that it shall apply to any renewal,
reinstatement, substitute, amended, altered, modified, or replacement policy
with this company or any affiliated company, unless a named insured revokes
it or selects a different option.

100.243
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I waive the option to purchase Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage
in an amount equal to the limits of my bodily injury liability coverage and either
elect the following limits for Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage or
reject Underinsured Motorist Bodily Injury Coverage.
Id. The form then offered the purchaser a selection of available limits with premiums
and provided a form by which the purchaser could reject UIM coverage or select
different limits. Id.
Prior to becoming an insurance agent, Warby was involved in an automobile
accident wherein the lack of Uninsured Motorist coverage was an issue. (R. 016770). Because of her experience in the accident and the lack of Uninsured Motorist
coverage, it was her practice when the Randalls' insurance policy forms were filled
out to share with each customer her personal experience with Uninsured Motorist
coverage to recommend and explain UM, UIM, and UMPD Coverage in detail to
each customer. Id. Warby's approach was consistent with Schroader-Blackley's
policy and practice to have each customer sign a form if the customer desired to
reject UIM coverage. (See id.; R. 0154-58.)
The signed insurance application no longer exists because the SchroaderBlackley Insurance Agency disposed of it after four years. Schroader-Blackley
Insurance retained the signed insurance application for the current year and an
additional three years. It disposed of the hard copy after the expiration of the time
period established by the state of Utah for retaining insurance documents. (R. 01600162); see also Utah Code Ann. §31A-23a-412.
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Randall did not pay a premium for Underinsured Motorist Coverage. (R.
0169.) All of the existing records from Schroader-Blackley Insurance show that
Randall rejected Underinsured Motorist Coverage. (R.0145-46, 0168-69, 0181.)
Likewise, the records from Progressive show that Randall rejected UIM coverage
and did not pay a premium for that coverage. (R. 0184.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision to grant summary judgment
in favor of Progressive because the undisputed material facts show that Randall
rejected UIM coverage. Judge Jones deemed the facts in Progressive's brief
admitted because Randall failed to comply with the requirements Rule 7(c)(3)(B)
places on the non-moving party. Under that rule, Randall was obligated to provide
a verbatim restatement of any fact he intended to dispute, and then explain the basis
of his dispute with reference to admissible evidence. Randall did not properly
dispute any facts, and the Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision that the
material facts are deemed admitted.
The Court should also affirm Judge Jones's decision to consider evidence of
the contents of the UIM rejection form in the absence of the original. Under Rule
1004, the Court may consider such evidence and it was proper for Judge Jones to
do so.
Finally, the Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision to grant summary
judgment because Progressive is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Randall
has erroneously urged the Court to reform the insurance contract because

100.243

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

i

Progressive can not physically produce the UIM rejection form that Randall signed.
Randall's position, however, is not supported by the facts or the law he has cited.
The UIM statute does not require the result Randall is espousing and Randall has
not cited any admissible evidence to support his position. With the evidence on the
record, the only conclusion a reasonable jury could reach is that Randall signed the
UIM rejection form as part of his insurance application. Randall has not cited any
admissible evidence to contradict that conclusion.
ARGUMENT
The Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision to grant summary judgment
because: (I) Judge Jones correctly deemed Progressive's statement of facts
admitted because Randall failed to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B); (II) an insurance
company may prove the existence and contents of a UIM rejection form through
circumstantial evidence; and (III) Judge Jones correctly granted summary judgment
that Randall rejected UIM coverage.
I.

JUDGE JONES CORRECTLY DEEMED PROGRESSIVE'S STATEMENT
OF FACTS ADMITTED BECAUSE RANDALL FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
RULE 7(c)(3)(B)
Randall failed to meet the requirements for an opposing memorandum to a

motion for summary judgment under Rules 7 and 56 and Judge Jones correctly
deemed Progressive's statement of facts as admitted.1 (R. 0192-0197.) Rule 56
requires that a motion for summary judgment must "be in accordance with Rule 7."

1

In addition to making this argument, Progressive maintains that there are
no genuinely disputed issues of material fact.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

«

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

"When a motion for summary judgment is made and

supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against
a party failing to file such a response." Id. 56(e).
Rule 7(c)(3)(A) requires the moving party to set forth facts it claims are
undisputed in separate numbered paragraphs with references to the record. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). The opposing memorandum must "contain a verbatim
restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted" with an
explanation of the dispute properly supported by citation to the record. Id. 7(c)(3)(B).
The requirement is mandatory. Jennings Inv., LC v. Dixie Riding Club, Inc., 2009 UT
App 119,1J23,208 P.3d 1077 (Utah Ct. App. 2009); Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT
App 25, 156 P.3d 175 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
In footnote 5 of the USA Power, LLC case, the Utah Supreme Court
emphasized that Rule 7(c)(3)(B) requires a court to deem uncontroverted facts
admitted. 2010 UT 31, p o n.5, 235 P.3d 749. That court wrote, "A trial judge has
no discretion in deeming facts admitted unless controverted." Id.
In this case, the Court should affirm Judge Jones's decision to deem the facts
admitted because Randall did not include a verbatim restatement of Progressive's
undisputed facts with an explanation of how those facts are disputed nor did he
include a fact section with any citation to record evidence. Instead, Randall offered

100.243
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<

a blanket statement that he was not disputing facts 1,4,7,8,16, and 17, but he was
disputing "all other 'facts.'" (R. 0193.) Randall's Memorandum in Opposition did not
contain any specific reference to record evidence. See id. Randall did not cite any
deposition testimony or refer to any specific documents in his opposing
memorandum.
Randall's failure to comply with the method mandated by Rule 7 prejudiced
Progressive because it deprived Progressive of the opportunity to provide a
meaningful response to the alleged disputes. Accordingly, Judge Jones made the
correct decision to deem Progressive's facts admitted for the purpose of summary
judgment.
II.

AN INSURANCE COMPANY MAY PROVE THE EXISTENCE AND
CONTENTS OF A DOCUMENT THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Randall has asked the Court "to interpret [the UIM statute] in a manner that

requires insurance companies to be able to physically produce a waiver form if they
are going to assert that the insured signed or provided such an express writing
rejecting underinsured motorist insurance." (Appellant Brief at 10-11.) The Court
should decline that invitation because the UIM statute does not contain any provision
that requires an insurance company to provide UIM coverage simply because the
UIM rejection form becomes lost or destroyed.
Utah's UIM statute requires the insurer to provide a form to the applicant, at
the time of application, that contains a reasonable explanation of the purpose of UIM
coverage and when it would be applicable. See Lopez v. United Automobile

-inn

OAI
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Insurance Company, 2009 UT App 389,f!7, 222 P.3d 1192 (2009). The purpose
for that requirement is to provide the insured with reasonable information about the
coverage he or she is choosing to decline. In the context of the uninsured motorist
statute, the Court of Appeals said,
It is clear that Utah Code section 31 A-22-305(3)(b) is not... designed
to simply memorialize the UM insurance decision after-the-fact. Rather,
the 2000 amendment was specifically adopted in order to 'affirmatively
inform' insureds about the costs of various levels of UM coverage
before they decide whether to purchase it and in what amounts.
General Sec. Indem. Co. v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109, If 12,158 P.3d 1121 (Utah Ct.
App. 2007).
Stated differently, the statute does not preclude an insurer from proving the
existence of the rejection form at a later time through other available evidence. If the
form becomes lost or destroyed, the insurer can prove the existence and contents
of the form through circumstantial evidence. UtahR. Evid. 1004. Judge Jones ruled
correctly on that issue and granted summary judgment in favor of Progressive based
on the available evidence.
III.

JUDGE JONES CORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT
RANDALL REJECTED UIM COVERAGE
The Court should affirm Judge Jones's correct conclusion that Progressive

was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. "A summary judgment movant, on an
issue where the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, may satisfy its
burden on summary judgment by showing, by reference to the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the

100.243
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i

affidavits, if any, that there is no genuine issue of material fact." Orvis v. Johnson,
2008 UT 2,1f18-19,177 P.3d 600 (Utah 2008) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c)). "Upon
such a showing, whether or not supported by additional affirmative factual evidence,
the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial." Id.
Progressive has satisfied its burden to show that Randall was presented with
the UIM rejection form, and Randall has failed to show that there is a genuine issue
for trial. He has asserted that Progressive, as the defendant, bears the burden to
disprove his claim,2 but he has failed to present admissible evidence that supports
his claim. Randall cited to an affidavit he signed on May 13, 2010 that was drafted
by his attorney, but the statement contained in that affidavit was not subject to crossexamination and it was not based on Randall's personal knowledge as demonstrated
by his deposition testimony taken several months later on September 3, 2010.
(Compare R. 0020 with R. 0174-75.)

2

Citing General Security Indemnity Company v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109,
158 P.3d 1121, Randall argued that the courts have shown a strong public
interest in interpreting UIM statutes liberally. Randall's reliance on that case,
however, is not on point and General Security is distinguishable for several
reasons. The important fact in General Security Indemnity Company was that the
insurance company did not even argue that it presented the plaintiff with a UM
waiver form. Id. 1J2, n.2. As such, the court "assumefd] that Fulcrum never
presented the acknowledgment form to Tipton . . ." and it Id. In this case by
contrast, Progressive has presented affirmative evidence that it presented
Randall with the UIM rejection form.
m n 943
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During his deposition, Randall admitted signing the application for insurance
in several places, but he did not have personal knowledge of the information
contained in the application forms. (R. 0174-75.) As such, he cannot competently
testify as to whether he signed the UIM rejection form, Form #5597, that was part of
the packet Progressive and Blackley-Schroader presented Randall to sign. Utah R.
Evid. 602.
The only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from the evidence is that
Randall signed the UIM rejection form provided by Progressive. That conclusion is
underscored by the sequence of the application process and the procedures by
which the UIM rejection form was generated.

The Affidavit of Maria Warby

establishes that she met with Randall and filled out an electronic application for
insurance based on "the Randallsf] selections on coverage." (R. 0168). After the
selection were made, "the insurance policy forms were printed out for the Randalls
to sign." Id. Ryan Blackley, the owner of Blackley-Schroader Insurance Agency,
testified that "[ajccording to which policy you're issuing, which coverages you are
selecting, the insurance company . . . software will print out the forms that need to
be signed and then we review that with the customer, obtain the signatures, obtain
the down payment and issue the policy." (R. 0153.) The Affidavit of Carol Jones
establishes that, based on Randall's policy number, he would have been provided
Form #5597 to review and sign. (R. 0187-88.) Form #5597 provided Randall a
reasonable explanation of the purpose of UIM coverage and when it would be
applicable.

100.243
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The reason Form #5597 was presented to Randall was that he told Maria
Warby he wanted to reject UIM coverage. That inference is not only supported by
the chronology of events, but it is consistent with other pieces of circumstantial
evidence such as the Declarations Page provided by Progressive indicating that UIM
coverage was "Rejected" and that Randall did not pay a premium for UIM coverage.
(R. 0184.) In addition, change forms generated by the insurance agency showed
that UIM coverage was rejected. (R, 0145-46, 0181-82.)
Randall's conduct lends further support to the conclusion that Randall rejected
UIM coverage. Judge Jones noted on the record,
It seems to me if he thought he had that coverage, when he got that
billing statement in the mail and saw that under insured coverage had
been rejected . . . he would have picked up the phone or gone to see
the people and said, 'Wait a minute, I thought I had under insured
coverage.' It shows right there on the billing statement it was rejected.
(Hearing Transcript, Addendum A at 26; 13-19.) The UIM statute provides that a
rejection "continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until the insured in writing
requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer." Utah Code Ann.
§31A-22-305.3(2)(g)(iii). Randall changed his coverage at least twice during the
policy period, but did not make a single request to withdraw his rejection of UIM
coverage.
In the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, Randall has argued that
the Court must conclude the missing form did not exist and that Blackley-Schroader
Insurance Agency elected to reject UIM coverage against Randall's will. Those
assumptions are not supported by the evidence and they are not reasonable

100 243
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inferences. Warby stated in her affidavit that it was her custom and habit to explain
UIM coverage to her clients and have them sign the forms. (R.0169.) Warby took
a personal interest in explaining to clients the benefits of UIM coverage because she
had a personal experience in which she learned the benefits of having UIM
coverage. Id. Additionally, the Court can take judicial notice that an insurance
agency earns commissions by selling clients insurance coverage. It was in Warby's
interest for Randall to purchase UIM coverage and she had no incentive to dissuade
him from purchasing UIM coverage. Neither Progressive nor Blackley-Schroader
had any reason to avoid selling Randall UIM coverage. In fact, their incentive was
to try to persuade Randall to purchase UIM coverage.
Contrary to Randall's position, the undisputed evidence shows that Warby
inputted Randall's UIM rejection into the electronic application based upon Randall's
own decision, that Progressive generated a UIM rejection form based on Randall's
election, and that Warby presented Randall with Form #5597 as part of the
application that Randall signed in several places. Judge Jones carefully considered
those facts and the Court should affirm his decision to grant summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The Court should affirm Judge Jones' decision to grant summary judgment
because there is no genuine issue for trial and the facts show that Progressive is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law that Rex Randall rejected UIM coverage at
the time he entered into an insurance contract with Progressive.
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-2P R O C E E D I N G S
(Electronicall y recorded on February 2, 2011)
THE COURT:

All right.

Good morning.

A r e we

on the

record?
COURT CLERK:
THE COURT:

Y es .
Let 's s e e , this is the time set for oral

argument on Rex Randall ^vs.

Progressive

C l a s s i c Insurances

It ' s

case 3913, and Mr. Gould , y o u ' r e here on b e h a l f of the pi ainti ff ?
MR. GOULD:

I am, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Is it M r . Joyce?

MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

Mr.

Schriever.

Mr. S c h r i v e r or S c h r i e v e r ?

MR. SCHRIEVER:

It's S c h r i e v e r .

I can s p e l l

it for y ou

if you want.
THE COURT:

Oka y.

MR. GOULD:

I can, too.

THE COURT:

All r i g h t .

MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

So v - e - r , all r i g h t .

MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

S-c-h-r-i-e-v-e-r.

My b a r n u m b e r

All r i g h t .

THE COURT:

That's

All r i g h t .

summary judgment, right?

10816

Y o u ' r e here

Progressive, I guess, th 2 i n s u r a n c e
MR. SCHRIEVER:

is

on b e h a l f

company?

c o r r e c t , for Mr . J o y c e
I guess

Plaintiff

of

I have c r o s s

had filed h.L S

as w e l l

m o t i o n s for

m o t i o n it
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looks

~3~
1
2

like in June, and then Progressive filed one in December, right?
I So I wonder in terms of batting order should we do Mr. Gould's

3

first?

4

MR. GOULD:

I would think it's appropriate --

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

6 J

MR. GOULD:

-- to do mine first.

7, L

THE COURT:

I might indicate I have had a chance to read

8
9

the briefs that were submitted by both sides, so -MR. GOULD:

Thank you.

10

THE COURT:

-- that will help.

11

MR. GOULD:

It's a lot of reading.

12

THE COURT:

It was.

13

J

All right.

If you want to first,

then, Mr. Gould, I'll be glad to hear from you and then we'll

1 4 I hear from Mr. Schriever.
15

MR. GOULD:

I anticipated your Honor would of course

16

read the lengthy memorandum here.

I thought about this case for

17

awhile, and I thought, you know, I'm going to try and do the

18

judge a favor and try and keep my argument on the short side.

19

THE COURT:

Okay.

20

MR. GOULD:

I kind of feel about this case that your

21

Honor's going to do what you're going to do, and I'm not sure

22

that the arguments we make are going to strongly impress you

23

either way in this case.

24

think despite the fact that we've had six relatively lengthy

25

What I am going to say is this.

I

I memorandum in support or in opposition to two separate motions,
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-4and it would seem relatively complex on its face, I can reduce
this case and this argument to a pretty simple proposition.
That proposition is this.

This case really turns on

what meaning your Honor chooses to give the statute 31A-32-305.3.
I hate the read the sub parts, but there are sub parts,
parentheses
section

(2) parentheses

(ii).

(g) parentheses section

(i) and

This section of the insurance code, as your Honor

is probably aware at this point in time, is that section of the
code which allows an insured who is seeking a policy from an
insurance company to elect or to waive the coverage, elect to
waive certain coverages.
Under Utah law it is permissible to waive under insured
motorist coverage, and it's permissible to waive uninsured
motorist coverage.

Of course, under insured motorist coverage

is what we're here and what we're talking about.
The legislature, though, deliberately made that process
a difficult process.

I think if your Honor peruses that statute

in any length that you'll conclude that there is a public policy
here, and that that public policy is to discourage the waiver
of -- or the non-purchase at least of those coverages.

The way

the legislature has chosen to do that is its written a very
specific process that must be followed into the statute.

That

statute requires that an insured -- perspective insured or actual
insured give an express writing to the insurance company saying,
"I do not want this coverage."
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J

Well, what we're here today about is the insurance

2

company can't produce an express writing from my client saying

3

that he waived this coverage, but yet is choosing to make an

4

argument that even though it can't produce this express writing

5

that it can somehow use other evidence to prove that this writing

6

I was in fact made, did exist at one point in time, and that

7

I Mr. Randall, my client, should be held and bound to the notion

8

I that he waived this coverage.

9

I

Mr. Randall maintains that there was no waiver.

He

10

I maintains that if he had signed any document like that that he'd

11

I remember it.

That is his deposition testimony in this case.

12

think that the proposition here is very simple, it's just the

13

legislature created a very specific process.

14

I

While the statute may not contain actual language that

15

says so, I think it's implicit in this statute, and what the

16

legislature was saying here that they were telling the insurance

17

company, "If you want to come to court or if you want to make the

18

argument that there was a waiver of under insured motorist

19

coverage, then insurance company, you produce that form."

20

come to court and make some kind of an argument that, "Well, we

21

had this form at one point in time, but because of the fact the

22

records weren't retained it was destroyed and so now what we're

Don't

23

I going to do is try and make an argument that based on business

24

practices where it was this standard business practice at an

25

agency that these forms were used and these forms were provided
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-6that the waiver must have been given."

That's in essence

Progressive Insurance's position in this case.
My position is very simple.

My position is is that this

statute, whether it says so directly or not, the intention of the
statute was that if the insurance company was going to make this
argument it would actually be able to produce the written waiver
that the insurance company -- the insurance agency supposedly
obtained.
I could go on and on.

I could make other arguments.

I

think my memorandum points out in very good language from written
treatises and this sort of a thing that these statutes were
written primarily for the benefit of insureds rather than
insurance companies.
I could point out what I believe is a growing trend
in a public policy here in Utah to try to see that people have
adequate insurance when they're involved in accidents.

That

public policy first began when we passed a financial
responsibility act years ago requiring people to have minimum
limits of liability coverage.

I believe that policy has been

expanded and it continues by creating these statutes that make it
difficult for people to waive under insured motorist coverage.
I don't think that these positions should be any
surprise or that they're radical or it's fashionable nowadays
to call a lot of things socialistic.

I think it's simply a

recognition that when people get in accidents and they get hurt
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I that they can have a lot of medical bills and there can be a lot

2

of implications and a lot of costs, and that's why this policy is

3

here.

4

note, your Honor.

5

I

6
7

I

I'm content to end my argument on this motion on that

THE COURT:

Can I just ask you, though, Mr. Gould?

MR. GOULD:

Sure.

THE COURT:

I mean let's assume just for the sake of

8

argument they can't find the waiver.

9

significant, though?

Isn't there something

According to what I read here, you agree,

10

don't you, that your client didn't pay the premiums for under

11

insured motorist?

12
13

MR. GOULD:

Yeah, that's correct, he didn't pay a

premium for it.

14

THE COURT:

I mean isn't that significant here?

Should

15

he be entitled to coverage even though he never paid the premium

16

for it?

17

MR. GOULD:

I tell you why I'm going to answer that yes.

18

When you get your insurance bill in the mail, I mean you don't

19

get a one sentence -- or a one line statement saying pay $200.

20

You get a very involved statement that has a long list of

21

coverages on it that are spelled out in three and four syllable

22

words, typically, and I'm not sure sometimes that even as an

23

attorney I completely understand everything the insurance company

24

sends me in the mail.

25

THE COURT:

I kept thinking on one of the billing
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statements that I looked at it lists the type of coverage, and
out to the side it shows whether or not they're covered or
whether he rejected it, and I thought one of those billing
statements says he rejected the under insured.
MR. GOULD:

There is a form.

THE COURT:

Don't you think if he thought he had that

coverage that he would have looked at the form and said,

M

Gee,

there's been a mistake," and call or notify the insurance
company, "Hey, wait a minute, I should have been covered under
this."
MR. GOULD:

I think some of people would have been --

what I'm saying is that I don't believe Utah law requires that.
I don't believe that Utah law ever intended to put the burden
on the insured in this kind of a situation.

What the Utah law

intended to do was to put the burden on the insurance company to
prove that the man had waived his coverage.
THE COURT:

But isn't there other ways to prove that

other -- for example, the best evidence, of course, would be the
waiver, right?
MR. GOULD:

Uh-huh.

THE COURT:

They don't have the waiver.

MR. GOULD:

Or a copy of it.

THE COURT:

Right.

So they don't have that.

Isn't the

next best thing to look at is whether or not, you know, he -- on
these forms whether or not he ever paid for under insured or

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-9whether -—
MR. GOULD:

I understand --

THE COURT:

-- or not the --

MR. GOULD:

-- your Honor's point

I understand what

you're saying, but I don't see how you squ are that wi th the
requirement in the statute that an express writing be given by
the insured to the insurance company.

If the statute speaks of

1
1

an express w riting f rom the insured to the insurance company,
then isn r t it implicit that a copy of the express writing that
they speak o f should be produced?
THE COURT:

But you agree that un der the statute that

1

these record s can be destroyed within what , four years or -MR. GOULD:

I'm glad you brought that point up because

what you r re talking about is you're talkin g about the general
records retention statute.
THE COURT:
forever.

Right, so we don't re quire them to keep them

In fact, I think it's four years , isn't it?
MR. GOULD:

Is it three years or four?

MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

It's three years.

Is it three?

MR. SCHRIEVER:

It was retained f or four is what Mr.

Blackley say s .
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. GOULD:

It's a general statut e that was not written

with the concept of insurance coverages an d under insured
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-10motorist coverage in mind when it was written.

I would suggest

that that statute -- all that statute does is it creates some
kind of a minimum.

It says you have to have these records for

this period of time, and I suspect the real reason that that
statute exists may have to do for purposes of like auditing,
taxes.
It may have to do with the insurance commission, the
fact that insurance is a regulated business here in Utah -- I
think everywhere.

That's the reason for a statute like that.

It certainly wasn't written with the idea that it would have some
bearing on an under insured motorist claim that someone might
bring.
I want to point something else out, too.

You know, this

insurance company had notice that there was an. accident, and
there was at least some insurance claim from its very inception.
THE COURT:

But didn't the claim come in after the four

MR. GOULD:

The under insured motorist claim --

THE COURT:

Right.

MR. GOULD:

-- came in after the period --

THE COURT:

Right.

MR. GOULD:

-- under the records retention statute ran.

year --

For the insurance company to sit here and say, "Well, we didn't
know that there was anything going on," I'm going to suggest that
it's the insurance company's business if they're going to be
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destroying records or not keeping these kind of things handy,

2

it's their job to go out and ask questions.

3

It's their job to

I come to me, who they had a letter from, and say, "We're on the

4

verge of destroying these records.

5

going to be an under insured motorist claim that's brought in

6

this case?"

7

I

Now do you think there's

If they had done that I would have told them what I had

8

thought we're pursuing a liability claim.

If and when we get a

9

tender of the liability policy limits in this case, then yes, I

10

will be at that point in time pursuing an under insured motorist

11

claim.

12

They know what the laws are in Utah.

For an automobile

13

insurance company to sit there and pretend that, you know, we

14

don't know that the laws in this state would allow someone making

15

an under insured motorist claim to potentially, you know, make

16

that claim, you know, after that three year record retention

17

statute or something, I mean that is disingenuous for them to

18

suggest that we -- you know, we have no awareness or idea that

19

this is something that could happen.

20
21
22

They are in a much better

I position to protect themselves against something like that than
a single uneducated insured person like Mr. Randall is.
THE COURT:

Let me just ask you one other question.

23

You're not suggesting that the insurance company acted in bad

24

faith, are you?

25

MR. GOULD:

No.

No, I'm not suggesting that they've
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-12acted in bad faith.
THE COURT:

I know the one statute talks about

destroying records and there's certain exceptions, and one was
bad faith.
MR. GOULD:

I'm not suggesting that they acted in bad

faith, but what I'm suggesting is is that if they destroyed these
records and now they're sitting here claiming that we're
prejudiced, you know, we're in this situation that we shouldn't
be in, I'm saying it's their fault because they probably have a
thousand times more awareness of the problems that could result
from that than someone like Mr. Randall has.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SCHRIEVER:

Thanks, Mr. Gould.

Thank you, Judge.

Mr. Schriever?

Having reread all the

documents and everything that were submitted to the Court this
morning, I'm going to submit that all of the evidence points to
the conclusion that Mr. Randall rejected under insured motorist
coverage, and that the only evidence that's in the record
contrary to that is his testimony that he would have not -- or he
would remember something if he had rejected it.
The problem as I see it is that affidavit testimony has
to be admissible in evidence, and I'm going to challenge the
admissibility of those -- of that statement based on lack of
personal knowledge.
The deposition transcript cited by Counsel in his
memoranda says that Mr. -- this is on page 29 of Mr. Randall's

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13deposition:
A.

I'm sure I'd remember it if I

rejected something.
The next question was:
Q.

Okay.

I appreciate that and I'm

going to get there, but I want to ask this
piece by piece.
And then we broke it down.
Q.

Do you recall receiving any forms

whatsoever from Progressive that dealt with
under insured motorist coverage?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you recall whether they provided

you any forms dealing with the insurance policy
at all that you had to sign?
A.

I know I signed a policy.

I signed

a form that's a policy form.
Q.

Okay.

Where did you sign that?

A.

I think -- I'm thinking I signed it

in the building of the office.
Then we go on to the next page, the question begins:
Q.

What was contained in the form that

you signed?
A.

I don't remember.

Q.

Do you remember how many pages it
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was?

2

A.

Not right offhand.

3

Q.

Do you recall if it was more than

4

one pag e?

5

A.

It was more than one, 1'iri sure.

6

Q.

Did it require more than one

7

signature?

8

A.

Yeah.

9

Q.

There were several places that you

10

signed?

11

A.

12

I'm sure of that.

So he a dmits that there was a several page form that

13

he signed, that he signed it in several places, but he does not

14

recall what he signed.

15

to that is not b ased on personal knowledge, it's based on his own

16

speculation, but it's not -- it wouldn't be admissible

17

That's the testimon y.

Anything contrary

Then we have the affidavit of Marl a Warby who was the

18

agent who wrote the policy.

19

only option for writing a Progressive polic y at that t ime was to

20

download an elec tronic form.

21

She filled that out and then she went throu gh that piece by piece

22

with the folks and had them sign each part.

23

Her testimony is that she -- the

There was one form that itfas used.

We also have the actual form that was used at that time

24

which contained the under insured motorist rejection 1 anguage,

25

which we've cite d in our memo -- our motion for summar y j udgment.
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I I believe the foundation is laid for that that was the form that

2

I would have been used at the time.

3
4

Ms. Warby's testimony is that

she's very conscientious about having people sign this rejection
I form.

She doesn't have a specific recollection of having

5

Mr. Randall it per se, but she always is conscientious to explain

6

I that because she was caught in a personal situation where she did

7

I not have UI coverage and she wished she had had it, and so her

8
9

practice is to always sign that.
I

The form was then uploaded electronically from the

10

Blackley Insurance Agency to Progressive with the rejection

11

indicated.

12

by Blackley.

13

Then Progressive sent out billing statements, policy renewal

14

forms, and without fail each one of them indicated that the UI

15

coverage had been rejected, and that there was no premium being

16

collected for that coverage.

17

those -- and that evidence is undisputed.

18

That form that contained the signatures was retained
It never went to Progressive Insurance per se.

That is what the evidence is, and

Based on that evidence, if we were to present that

19

evidence to a jury, the only reasonable conclusion a jury could

20

make is that that form was presented to Mr. Randall, that he

21

signed the form in several different places and that that form

22

contained the UI rejection form and the signature that was then

23

uploaded and that there were never any premiums paid on that.

24
25

This in a way is kind of like someone going to a WalMart store and saying, "I came here five years ago and there was
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a sale on a t.v., and I think I might have wanted to buy it, but

2

I can't remember if I did.

3

that date that I didn't buy it, then you owe it to me and I'm

4

going to walk out of it with -- out today."

5

sense.

6

If you can't produce a receipt from

It just doesn't make

Counsel has indicated his thoughts that the statute

7

contains clear language that the burden is shifted to the

8

defendant to actually produce the express writing.

9

any language in the statute that says that.

I don't see

The Rules of

10

Evidence don't say that, and there's no case law that says that.

11

What the burden is is to prove that the express writing

12

existed at one point in time, and the undisputed facts do

13

demonstrate that it did exist at one time, and that Mr. Randall

14

signed that form on several different -- at several different

15

locations.

16

I'm happy to answer any questions the Court may have.

17

I don't mean to ramble.

18

Mr. Gould was making his arguments.

19

really that material to the Court's consideration, but I'd be

20

happy to address any other --

21
22
23

THE COURT:

There were some notes that I made as
I'm not sure that they're

I guess the only question that -- so you

just can't find the waiver, if there is one?
MR. SCHRIEVER:

Right.

I mean --

Progressive's policy at that

24

time was that the agency -- and this -- Blackley is an insurance

25

brokerage.

They don't just write for Progressive, they write for
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other companies as well -- Traveler's.

2

bought another policy from them afterwards from -- I can't

3

remember the name of the company -- United.

4

THE COURT:

These folks actually

So you can find the application for

5

I insurance, but you just can't find if there was waiver or not?

6

J

7
8
9

MR. SCHRIEVER:

No, the application contained the

waiver, and that was put into a box in Blackley's storage.
I

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, I guess the argument from

Mr. Gould is the fact that you can find the application but not

10

the waiver would suggest, I guess, that he never signed a waiver.

11

Is that

12
13

—
MR. SCHRIEVER:

explain.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. SCHRIEVER:

16

That's not accurate, and let me try and

Okay.
The application was what was not

retained by Blackley.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. SCHRIEVER:

19

person has.

20

Progressive.

Okay.
So there's written application that the

That information is transmitted electronically to

21

THE COURT:

So you don't even have the application?

22

MR. SCHRIEVER:

But the application itself, the written

23

application is what Blackley retained, and they retained that for

24

four years is what his testimony was, and then they discarded it.

25

THE COURT:

Okay.
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-18MR. SCHRIEVER:

Well, it's not —

I was going to talk

about Progressive's retention policies, but that's not in the
record, it's not before the Court, so -THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

But the --

And so the application is gone, the waiver

is gone if it was ever signed.
MR. SCHRIEVER:

Right.

So what we've got is the

testimony of Blackley as to what his policies and procedures
were, testimony of the Progressive lady who was -- who has laid
the foundation for what form was used at that time, and the
testimony of Maria Warby, who was the agent who actually wrote
and uploaded the policy as to what her standard procedures were.
THE COURT:

So from your standpoint for the insurance

company, is it significant to you that he didn't pay the premiums
for under insured?
MR. SCHRIEVER:

Well, I think it's very significant,

Judge, because it's an indication that he had several
opportunities to correct a problem if he had intended to purchase
UI insurance.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

His acquiescence to that --

The other thing I noticed again, it's the

automobile insurance coverage summary, it's marked as Exhibit 1
in the -- and it says under insured motorist and it has rejected.
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-19Was that something that would have been sent to him —

to

Mr. Randall?
MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

That is correct, Judge.

Okay.

Is that sent to him at the time that

he applies for the insurance, this coverage summary or
MR. SCHRIEVER:

—

Any time there was activity on that

policy it would be sent to him, which would mean -- and I think
that was -THE COURT:

His coverage began January 4 th , 2006, expires

July 4th, 2006.
MR. SCHRIEVER:

Yeah.

So if there's a renewal on that

policy then it's going to be sent.

I think there was one in

June that we marked as an exhibit as well that was a change in
automobile coverage so it was sent again.
that was sent out.

So this was something

I believe the payments were made

electronically, so I can't state whether that was a monthly
statement or not, but I do know that there would have been -any time there was activity on that policy -- changes in policy
that it would have been sent out.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Then there's another one, there's

another document in there that's marked as Exhibit 2.

Let me

see if that's -- anyway, it says the same thing, under insured
motorist, and then out to the side it says rejected.
two different documents.

So there's

It says this change is requested by

Maria via internet on January 13 th , 2006.

I assume that would
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-20have also gone to him; would it not?
MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

Okay..

MR. SCHRIEVER:

All right.

No.

Anything else?

1

I' d be happy to address the

retention statute if you want me to.

I

I don't th ink it's

1

necessary, but -THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

Thank you, Judge.

All right.

Thank you.

Did I get it wrong,

1

was it Schriver or Schriever?
MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

It is Schriever, but --

Schriever.

MR. SCHRIEVER:

Sorry, I said S chriver twice.

With a name like Schriever you just --

1
1

you answer to just about anything.
THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

Mr. Gould, any response to
MR. GOULD:

I'm sorry about that.

—

I'll just --- I'm going to a ddress two

or three things, and it's going to conclude my argument.
Mr. Randall's deposition testimony where he didn 't remember some
of the forms he signed in the insurance company' s office, I'm
going to suggest that shouldn't surprise anyone at all.

You

know, I -- the law does not impose a requirement on people who
purchase insurance to remember things like that.

The law imposes

the requirements on insurers to prove the type o f insurance that
people have and do not have.
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Mr. Schriever is correct that the statute in question,

2

I the under insured motorist waiver statute doesn't have specific

3

J language in it saying the insurance company must produce the

4

I express writing that it speaks of if there's a dispute like

5

I this.

6

I statute makes it almost invalid, it makes it almost unnecessary

7

I to have that statute

8
9

I'm going to suggest that any other interpretation of that

(inaudible).

Your Honor, I'm not trying to say that there is
wrongdoing in this particular case.

That's not my intention

10

here, but stop and think about this one for a minute.

If that's

11

the interpretation that this statute is going to be given that

12

the insurance company does not need to actually produce the

13

express writing when this issue comes up, and instead the

14

insurance company can fall back on things like, "Well, we'll have

15

someone come to court and testify what our business practices of

16

our agents were," even -- and even when they can't remember the

17

specific person coming in they're going to come in and testify

18

what their business practices were, that testimony is always

19

going to be, "Yeah, we had a business practice where these people

20

were given this form to sign, and they always signed the form and

21

they either accepted it or they rejected the coverage."

22

never going to have a case where that defense isn't made and

23

where that testimony isn't given.

24

the world works, and that's why it's necessary to give this

25

particular interpretation to the statute that if the insurance

You're

I mean that's just the way
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-22company wants to make this defense, it's got to give you a copy
at least of the writing it claims the insured actually made
saying, "I waive this coverage."
Now your Honor makes some points.

Your Honor makes

some points about, you know, there were mailings to Mr. Randall
saying that he didn't have this coverage, there were mailings to
Mr. Randall saying that he'd waive the coverage.
a very unsophisticated man.

Mr. Randall is

There's a lot of people out there

who are very unsophisticated people.
I haven't given Mr. Randall a literacy test, but I
suspect if I did that he wouldn't score very high on it, and
that's true of a lot of people out there.
what.

You may say well, so

You know, I mean the insurance company's job isn't to test

everybody's reading skills.
Well, no, it isn't.

That isn't their job, but their --

that's why it's all the more important that the burden be put on
the insurance company in these situations to produce these waiver
forms so that we don't have these kinds of disputes and we don't
have these problems.
How difficult would it have been to have kept these
records?

In this computer age, in this electronic world we live

in, how difficult would it have been for an insurance company
that had awareness that this accident had occurred to have hung
on to this?
difficult.

I don't think it would have been even slightly
These records were simply disposed of because there
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was what I'm going to call kind of a brain dead corporate policy

2

in place saying after four years, or after however many years you

3

get rid of the records.

4

agent to contact Progressive and say, "Would there be a need to

5

keep these particular records?"

6

You know, no attempt on the part of the

Mr. Randall and the rest of us shouldn't be held hostage

7

to what I'm going to call a bad corporate policy, and it's a bad

8

corporate policy to permit the destruction of these kinds of

9

records when the company knows that there is a cl aim that is

10

pending.

11

had occurred.

12

you.

13
14

We wouldn't be here today fighting over this if that
We'd have an answer one way or the other.

THE COURT:

All right.

Thanks, Mr. Gould.

Thank

Anything

J

else?

15

MR. SCHRIEVER:

16

THE COURT:

Nothing further, Judge.

All right.

I appreciate the arguments,

17

and also the motions.

18

First of all, you know, it seems to me the facts are fair iy

19

straight forward.

20

what happened, and of course, Mr. Randall applies for aut Dmobile

21

insurance with Progressive Insurance Company.

22

through -- is it Schroeder-Blackley; is that what they're

23

called - - Schroeder-Blackley Agency, and that took place, I

24

believe, in June of 2005 initially.

25

1

I think I'm ready to rule on this :ase.

There doesn't seem to be a lot of dispu te over

He does that

The agency or the agent retained the app lication and
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-24some of the forms for a period of four years, at least that's
what they were supposed to do.

They discarded those, however,

all the forms before the plaintiff had actually filed his claims.
So the hard copies, if you will, were all discarded.
As you pointed out, under Utah state law, it mandates
that they retain those for a period of one year, and that I
believe is under 31A-23A-412 paren
had out of your briefs.

(5)(a), at least that's what I

So there's a one year period that you're

supposed to keep the applications, so he applies for insurance in
June of

>n

5 and it's discarded in

x

06, I guess, the originals.

Then the claim is filed sometime after that.
According to the agency, the plaintiff elected to reject
the under insured motorist coverage based on their review of the
records and their forms.

Of course, we don't have either the

original or a copy of a waiver, if in fact it was signed, but
that's the position taken by Progressive is that he must have
elected to reject the insurance coverage based on a review of our
records, meaning the agency's records.
It's clear also from the memorandums and the motion that
Mr. Randall did not pay the premiums for under insured motor
coverage.

Also the statements from Progressive, at least from

the agents are that the plaintiff was not paying for under
insured coverage, and their position is that he rejected, the
under insured coverage, and there are a number of documents in
the file indicating that.

I think we've already talked about
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-25they're part of the briefs and the memorandums indicating when
you get down to under insured coverage out to the side it says
rejected, so that's the position of Progressive.
I know the position of Mr. Randall is that he doesn't
really remember.
that decision.

He thinks he would have remembered if he made
Of course, the position of Mr. Randall is that

the burden is on the insurance company to keep those forms.

If

they don't have the forms then he's entitled to the presumption
or the benefit that he must not have ever signed a waiver of that
kind of coverage.
There are a couple of things as far as ruling on the
case.

It seems clear that under Rule 1004 -- I guess that's the

Utah Rules of Evidence -- that clearly you can prove forms were
signed or that waivers were signed if the originals are destroyed
and there's no bad faith.

It seems clear that the originals have

been destroyed, and frankly, there's no indication here -- I
think I asked Mr. Gould if they were alleging bad faith by the
insurance company, and he said no.
So since the original -- the hard copy has been
destroyed, it seems clear that the insurance company can use
copies and they can use circumstantial evidence to prove whether
or not the waiver was ever signed or not signed.

Again, that's

Rule 1004 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
To me what this boils down to really is the question of
whether he ever paid the premiums.

I just -- I'm having a tough
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-26time as a judge believing that he ever did anything concerning
the waiver when he's not paying the premiums.

It doesn't seem

fair to me that he should get the benefit of under insured
coverage if he's not paying the premium.

I understand your

argument, Mr. Gould, that somehow he may not be sophisticated,
but it seems to me that he didn't ask for under insured coverage.
If he would have, they would have docked him with paying those
premiums for under insured coverage.

It doesn't seem that he

should get the benefit of that coverage if he's not paying the
premium.
The other argument is -- again is the billing
statements.

There are several billing statements that show that

he rejected that coverage, under insured insurance.

It seems to

me if he thought he had that coverage, when he got that billing
statement in the mail and saw that under insured coverage had
been rejected, either by him or by -- he would have picked up the
phone or gone to see these people and said, "Wait a minute, I
thought I had under insured coverage."

It shows right here on

the billing statement it was rejected.
Again, it's -- there's no violation of the law to
destroy records after three years.
it under 31A-23A-412.5.

There's nothing illegal about

So the Court's going to find that

clearly the originals have been destroyed.
the insurance company.

There's no bad on

The insurance company can use copies and

records to try to determine or answer the question of whether or
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-27not he signed the waiver of coverage.

The Court's going to find

that he did not have under insured coverage and didn't request
it, that he had -- the plaintiff really had rejected the
coverage, even though we can't find the waiver.
The other thing that I wanted to comment on, and that
is that it was pointed out in the defendant's brief, in
defendant's motion for summary judgment, Mr. Gould, you never
really addressed some of the facts that they were alleging in
their brief.

So my understanding of the law is that if you don't

address those, they're deemed to be admitted.

So based on your

answer to the defendant's motion for summary judgment, the Court
has to deem that all of the facts alleged in the defendant's
brief -- in Progressive are deemed to be admitted, and I think
that's Rule 7 and Rule 56.
So based on that, the Court is going to grant summary
judgment for the defendant -- for Progressive -- and deny the
motion for summary judgment for the plaintiff.

Now anything I

needed to cover or clarify in the ruling?
MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

No.

All right.

Mr. Schriever, would you prepare

the order and submit that to Mr. Gould?
MR. SCHRIEVER:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Thank you.

Okay.

(Hearing concluded)
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